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As a result of decisions by numerous state and federal commissions and tribunals, 
most recently the Fair Work Commission, penalty rates have become an important 
influence on the labour market in Australia. The paper investigates how relevant 
are the myriad penalty rates to today's social mores and the modern service-based 
economy. What are the consequences of penalty rates for employment, productivity, 
profitability and consumer welfare? What would be the impact of their removal? 
A number of data sources are analysed in the context of the economics of labour 
markets to answer these questions. The restaurant, café and catering industry is 
used as a specific example to illustrate the effects of penalty rates.
Introduction
Penalty rates by their very name imply that businesses must pay a penalty for 
imposing conditions which are said to disadvantage employees. The notion of 
a ‘penalty’ rate has its origin in a labour market quite different from that of 
much of the Australian labour market today. The Australian economy used to 
be characterised by mostly males working full-time in industrial jobs. There 
was little part-time or casual work. Working married women and jobs with 
flexible hours were rare (Norris et al. 2004). Most retail outlets shut at midday 
on Saturday and reopened on Monday. The weekends were, for many, the only 
time available for socialising, recreation, participating in sport and worship.
The Australian economy has undergone significant structural change over the 
past three decades, the pace of which accelerated in the late 1980s and 1990s. 
While policy has changed, industries have also embraced new technologies 
and have become increasingly involved in the global economy. There have 
been significant changes in labour demand (Lewis et al. 2010). The demand 
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for full-time workers, particularly males, has not kept pace with supply. The 
growth in part-time work has been an important source of jobs growth. There 
has been a substitution of female workers, particularly part-time, for full-time 
male workers. For certain groups, the changes in demand have been particularly 
noticeable. For instance, a full-time job for anyone 15–20 years old is now an 
exception rather than the rule and if you are a youth in a part-time job there 
is an over 80 per cent chance you will be a student (Lewis and McLean 1998). 
Another major feature of the changing Australian labour market is growth in 
casual employment. The growth of casual work was an important phenomenon 
in the 1980s and 1990s and the proportion of all employees that is casual reached 
over 20 per cent by 2010 (ABS 2010).
Much of the changing composition of employment can be attributed to a 
changing industry mix. In 1975 the ‘soft’ services (such as health, finance, 
retail, education, restaurants, and so on) accounted for just over 50 per cent 
of all jobs, but by 2013 the sector accounted for more than 70 per cent of all 
jobs (ABS 2012a). By contrast, manufacturing’s share of total employment 
almost halved over the same period to about 10 per cent in 2013. There were 
also reductions in the relative shares of jobs in the ‘industrial’ services (such 
as construction, communications, electricity, gas and water). With respect to 
the distribution of employment by occupation the picture that emerges when 
combined with the industry distribution is that a ‘typical’ Australian worker 
today is a ‘white-collar’ employee in the service sector (Lewis 2008). It may be 
thought that for a modern service-based economy, such as Australia, imposing 
higher wages (penalty rates) when the demand for services is often greatest is 
something of an anomaly.
In this paper it is argued that penalty rates have significant negative effects on 
the economy. An industry particularly affected by penalty rates, namely the 
cafe, restaurant and catering industry, is used as an example to illustrate these 
effects.
Are penalty rates relevant to modern 
Australian society?
Penalty rates have their origins in social mores of the past. The thinking behind 
penalty rates is encapsulated in the original decisions of the Commonwealth 
Court of Conciliation and Arbitration (CCCA). For instance:
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… the (extra rate for Sunday work) is given because of the grievance 
of losing Sunday itself – the day for family and social and religious 
reunion, the day on which one’s friends are free, the day that is the most 
valuable for rest and amenity under our social habits …
The norm of work should be six week days and Sundays free, the 
departure from the norm should be two time-and-a half rates, which is 
equivalent to one double rate. (CCCA 1919)
and:
Saturday, it is said, is the great day of recreation, while Sunday is the 
day of religious observance and family reunion. Saturday is the day on 
which competitive sports and various forms of organised social activities 
and public entertainment are held, as well as being the day which by 
common usage has come to be set aside for individual recreation in 
outdoor activity. (CCCA 1947)
For some, very much the same logic applies today to a very different economy. 
For instance, this view is encapsulated in this speech (D’Amore 2005) in the 
New South Wales parliament:
Shift loadings and penalty rates for work in ordinary time on weekends 
and work outside the normal span of hours are intended to compensate 
for the inconvenience associated with working unsociable hours. Work 
after 5.30p.m. is generally regarded as being in unsociable hours, and 
has a negative impact on both personal and family wellbeing. With a 
higher female participation in the work force, the pressures on family 
interaction are now greater. For individuals this pressure has increased 
with more work being performed during unsociable hours.
and:
Employees are less inclined to work on Saturdays and Sundays because 
they are dominant days for sport, leisure, community activities and 
religious celebrations. Time off during the week does not compensate 
for time lost on Saturdays and Sundays. This is the reason workplace 
arrangements have always recognised and endorsed penalty rates in the 
form of higher hourly payments for these days. Working unsociable 
hours interferes with family and personal commitments and has a 
negative impact on family relations, family and individual wellbeing.
The ABS produces estimates of individuals’ and households’ time use, including 
time spent on leisure activities. The ABS (2008a) definition of sport and outdoor 
activity includes organised and informal sport, exercise, walking, fishing, hiking 
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and holiday travel and driving for pleasure. According to the ABS (2008) (Table 
1 below), the amount of time spent on sport and outdoor activity (25 minutes 
per day) was the second-most popular activity for men in 2006.
However, audio/visual media (154 minutes per day) far exceeds time spent on 
sport. For women, time spent on sport and outdoor activity (17 minutes per 
day), again was eclipsed by time spent on audio/visual media (122 minutes per 
day); talking and correspondence (36 minutes per day); reading (25 minutes per 
day) and other free time (18 minutes per day).
Table 1: Average time spent on leisure activities (2006, minutes per day)
Males Females
Weekday Weekend Weekday Weekend
Socialising 6 20 7 19
Visiting entertainment venues (a) 2 8 4 8
Attendance at sports event *1 6 — 4
Religious activities (b) *2 8 4 10
Community participation 8 7 11 9
Associated travel 7 22 9 21
Social and community interaction (c) 27 71 35 73
Sport and outdoor activity 20 37 16 21
Games, hobbies, arts, crafts 13 18 11 15
Reading 19 25 23 29
Audio/visual media 144 181 117 134
Other free time 20 29 16 24
Talking and correspondence (d) 21 31 34 43
Associated travel 5 10 4 6
Recreation and Leisure (c) 243 332 223 273
Total free time 270 403 259 346
*estimate has a relative standard error of 25 per cent to 50 per cent and should be used with caution.
- nil or rounded to zero (including null cells).
(a) includes cultural venues.
(b) includes ritual ceremonies.
(c) includes additional activities not separately included.
(d) includes talking on phone or reading/writing own correspondence.
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics (2008a), Time Use on Recreation and Leisure Activities, Australia, 
Cat No 4173.0.
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As Table 1 shows, the average amount of time that people spent on recreation 
and leisure activities increases on the weekend compared with weekdays, with 
men spending more time (332 minutes a day) on the weekend on these activities 
than women (273 minutes a day).
For men the amount of time spent on sport and outdoor activity increases by 
only 17 minutes per day on the weekend and for women by only five minutes 
per day compared with time spent during the week. Men spend more time on 
the weekend on sport and outdoor activity than women (37 minutes compared 
with 21 minutes).
Religious activity is found to be a relatively minor activity with respect to time 
use. Just as for weekdays, by far the greatest expenditure on free time is in 
audio/visual media (45 per cent for men and 39 per cent for women). The total 
amount of free time in the week is 33 per cent lower on the weekdays for men 
and 25 per cent for women.
Therefore, even under this extremely broad category of sport and outdoor 
activity, the time spent, even on weekends, is not large and pales into comparison 
with other activities. Clearly, for most, working on weekends would not 
significantly impose on their time spent on sport and outdoor activities.
Figure 1: Christian affiliation, 1911 to 2006 (percentage of population)
Source: National Church Life Survey (NCLS 2010); ABS Yearbook of Statistics 2006, Cat No 1301.0.
While it may well once have been the case that “Sunday is the day of religious 
observance”, this is only true of a minority of Australians today. Data compiled 
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from various sources for the National Church Life Survey (NCLS 2010) indicate 
that while over 60 per cent of Australians consider themselves Christians, this 
has fallen from over 96 per cent in 1911 (see Figure 1).
According to that survey, the number attending church fell from 44 per cent 
in 1950 to 17 per cent in 2007 (see Figure 2). Clearly, Sunday is not a day of 
religious activity for the majority of Australians. According to the NCLS (2010), 
regular church attendance is concentrated among certain demographics. About 
half of church attenders are employed, 28  per  cent are employed full-time, 
14  per  cent are employed part-time and 9  per  cent are self-employed. Some 
30 per cent are retired, reflecting the older age profiles of attenders. Around 
15 per cent indicate that they are performing full-time home duties or family 
responsibilities and 9 per cent are students. Around 3 per cent are unemployed.
Figure 2: Regular church attenders, percentage of population
Source: National Church Life Survey (NCLS 2010, derived from ‘various social surveys’).
Among young people, although 15–19-year-olds represents 9 per cent of the 
population they make up less than 6 per cent of church attenders. For the 20–29 
age group, the respective per centfigures were 17 and 9 per cent.
The Australian economy today is dominated by the service sector – part-time 
work, casual work, working women and flexibility are the norm for many. 
Also, the social mores which defined Australian society have to a large degree 
changed radically over time. Among the most relevant here are the growth in 
participation in education and the consequent supply of part-time and casual 
labour, participation in the workforce of women with children, and the use of 
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leisure time for other activities, including church attendance and participation 
in sporting activities. Both of the latter account for a very small percentage of 
people’s leisure time on weekends.
The cafe, restaurant and catering services 
industry: A case study
Penalty rates apply to many service industries but are particularly relevant to 
the cafe, restaurant and catering services industry, which receives particular 
attention in this paper.
According to the ABS (2008b) at the end of June 2007, the latest year for which 
detailed data are available, there were 15,423 businesses in Australia involved 
in the provision of cafe, restaurant and catering services. There are no reliable 
more recent estimates of the structure of the industry but it is unlikely to have 
changed significantly since. Collectively, these businesses employed 195,814 
people. Total industry value added by these businesses was $5.7 billion. During 
2006–07, the operating profit before tax for these businesses was $576.4 million 
and their operating profit margin was 4.2 per cent.
This does not include the industry’s importance to to suppliers such as food 
wholesalers, farmers etc. or to complementary industries in, for instance, the 
tourism sector which benefit from amenable services at low prices from the 
industry.
In relation to costs, labour costs – which account for 36 per cent of the total – are 
the most significant expense. By comparison, labour costs for other industries 
make up about 20 per cent of the total on the average (ABS 2012d).
The cafe, restaurant and catering services industry is highly competitive 
and consists mainly of small businesses, with smaller cafes and restaurants 
accounting for around two-thirds (67.5  per  cent) of the total. For the whole 
industry there are about 10,300 businesses (67 per cent) employing fewer than 
10 people and 14,000 businesses (91 per cent) employing fewer than 20. These 
businesses employ about 100,000 people in total and generate over $13.7 billion 
in income (ABS 2008b).
Cafe, restaurant and catering services are characterised by a large casual 
workforce which accounts for just over half of all employment. Permanent 
full-time employees account for under a quarter of all employment, while 
permanent part-time employees account for 15.5 per cent. Females account for 
just over half of all employment and most (57 per cent of female employment 
or 59,332 people) worked as casuals (ABS 2008b). The remaining categories of 
Agenda, Volume 21, Number 1, 2014
12
employment – working proprietors and partners of unincorporated businesses; 
and salaried directors of incorporated businesses – account for 5.7 per cent of 
total employment.
Over 40 per cent of all employees in the industry are under 24 years old, compared 
to less than 14 per cent for the economy as a whole. Clearly, the industry is a 
major source of employment for young people. The growth of part-time work 
for young people has also been a major factor in improving participation of 
youth in education.
Most employees in the industry are single. Women with children make up 
22 per cent of the workforce in the industry and of these 57 per cent work part-
time (ABS, Census of Poulation and Housing, 2006, unpublished). The industry 
has, together with retailing, the highest percentage of women with children 
working part-time.
The Restaurant Industry Award 2010 (AIRC 2010) sets out the minimum pay 
and conditions for workers in the industry. Specifically it provides for: 
34.1 Penalty rates for work on weekends and public holidays 
An employee working ordinary time hours on the following days will 
be paid the following percentage of the minimum wage in clause 20 – 
Minimum wages for the relevant classification:
Table 2: Minimum wage rates for the relevant classification, cafes, 
restaurants and catering
Type of employment Monday to Friday Saturday Sunday Public Holidays
% % % %
Full-time and part-time 100 125 150 250
Casual (inclusive of 25% 
casual loading) 
125 150 175 250
Source: (AIRC 2010).
In addition to these major features, there are a myriad of other conditions which 
employers must adhere to, such as: paying employees over 18 years of age the 
21-year-old rate rather than the junior rate if they serve alcohol; penalties for 
working between 10pm and 7am; and a prohibition on lowest pay-grade workers 
from taking money from customers or showing them to their table!
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The impact of penalty rates
In assessing the impact of penalty rates on employment, it is first necessary to 
address the question of what determines employment in any industry (and the 
wage paid). The simple answer is, the demand and supply of labour. The matter 
is, however, complicated by institutional arrangements governing employment 
such as legally binding minimum wages and employment conditions (including 
penalty rates).
Businesses determine the demand for labour. The demand for labour is generally 
thought to depend on the wage rate or, more correctly, the costs of employing 
labour, which typically includes many other costs apart from the wage (see, 
for example, Hamermesh 1993; Lewis and Seltzer 1996; Lewis and MacDonald 
2002). A firm’s decisions about how much output to produce and how much 
labour to hire are made simultaneously. Firms hire extra labour when the value 
of the extra output produced is greater than the wage. Firms will only increase 
output if activities which were not previously profitable are made profitable. In 
the case of a restaurant, for example, if the size of the restaurant, number of cash 
registers, tables etc. remain fixed, each successive employee hired (or extra hour 
worked) will result in a lower increase in output than the one before. Businesses 
will employ more people (or increase hours of employment) as long as the extra 
revenue generated exceeds the extra cost of employing them. Therefore, extra 
output and extra employment requires a fall in labour costs and, conversely, a 
rise in labour costs will make otherwise profitable activities no longer profitable, 
so firms hire fewer people and produce less.
To get to grips with the effects of an imposed wage it is necessary to dig deeper 
into the operations of the labour market. In reality there is not a single labour 
market but rather very many labour markets each with their own supply 
and demand. An important characteristic of the multitude of labour markets 
is substitutability. Although it is common, particularly in the professions, to 
think of occupations being rigidly defined, in practice there is a great deal of 
substitutability of workers between and within industries and occupations.
In the case of a cafe/restaurant the potential for, or even necessity of, substitution 
is fairly obvious. Consider the following example. A cafe is staffed by a barista 
responsible mainly for the drinks; a cook who produces sandwiches and light 
meals; and various waiters/waitresses. The owner-manager does a whole range 
of tasks such as keeping the accounts and other paperwork, collecting supplies, 
hiring staff and doing virtually any of the jobs of other staff should the need 
arise. During peak times, or when colleagues are on breaks, the owner or other 
staff can take on different roles. One of the waitresses can only work between 
9am and 3pm because she needs to drop off and pick up children from school. 
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Mostly students are employed the rest of the time because they can fit work in 
around their classes. Students are particularly keen to work on weekends since 
it doesn’t clash with study and they don’t have the family commitments that 
some of their colleagues may have. For some of those with family commitments, 
however, weekend work can work to their advantage since a partner can look 
after children and avoid the child-care costs incurred when both partners are 
working during the week.
Most empirical studies of individual labour markets point to the high degree 
of substitutability, with respect to demand, between types of labour. There 
is also strong evidence that, given the degree of substitutability, the demand 
for labour in more narrowly defined labour markets is highly responsive to 
relative wages (Hamermesh 1993; Lewis 1985; Daly et al. 1999). Also, generally, 
the lower skilled the worker, the more responsive is demand to relative wages 
(Hamermesh 1993).
As is well known, the industry’s elasticity of demand for labour depends on 
the elasticity of factor substitution, labour’s share of total costs and the price 
elasticity of the demand for the industry’s output. The precise formula (which 
sheds a lot of light on the relationship between wages and demand) for the long-
run elasticity of demand can be shown (Hamermesh 1993) to be:
e = -(1-s) σ + sή
where:
e is the elasticity of demand for hired labour (negative)
s is the proportion of hired labour costs in the total cost of production
σ is the elasticity of substitution between hired labour and other inputs (positive)
ή is the elasticity of demand for output (negative).
In other words, what this formula says is that:
a. when wages rise this causes an increase in costs which firms must adjust to. 
The bigger the share of total costs which are hired labour costs then the larger 
the impact on firms. Firms will attempt to replace higher-cost labour with other 
inputs, such as family and owner’s labour, and demand for hired labour will 
fall. Their ability to do this will depend on how easily hired labour can be 
replaced by other inputs, the elasticity of substitution, and how labour intensive 
the production process is (labour’s share of total costs).
b. firms also attempt to pass on the increased costs to buyers of their products. 
If demand for these products is very price sensitive (high elasticity of demand 
for output), then even small cost increases cause large falls in demand for output 
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and demand for labour. Output demand tends to be elastic where there is a 
high degree of competition and consumers regard goods and services as relative 
luxuries. If demand for these products is relatively insensitive to price (low 
elasticity of demand for output) then relatively small cost increases cause only 
small falls in demand for output and demand for hired labour. Low elasticity 
of demand is usually found where there is little competition and consumers 
regard goods and services as relative necessities, such as basic food and shelter. 
Nevertheless, whatever the size of the response, wage rises always cause a fall in 
demand for hired labour.
The above formula is for elasticity of labour demand in the long run, after 
capital has had time to adjust to any change rate. There is also a corresponding 
elasticity of labour demand  in the short run, before capital has had any time to 
adjust (Hicks 1932).
e = σ ή / (σ s-[1-s]ή)
Using this framework the impact of wage changes in a particular industry can 
be predicted by making reasonable assumptions about the parameters, s, σ and 
ή. We saw above that in the cafe, restaurant and catering services industry hired 
labour accounts for a higher percentage of total costs (s) than for other industries, 
the degree of substitution between employees (σ) is high and, since restaurant 
meals are generally thought to be luxury good (Hubbard et al. 2011), then ή is 
high. This suggests that a fall in wages in the industry would be expected to 
result in a significant increase in the demand for hired labour.
Providing precise estimates of the impact of wage changes on employment 
in an industry is difficult because there are few empirical studies available 
for Australia. However, making some reasonable assumptions, based on the 
following Australian and overseas evidence, one can provide some broad 
estimates.
The empirical work for Australia on the degree of substitution between 
different types of labour has largely arisen out of the debates regarding the 
appropriate rates for junior wages. In an early study for the Bureau of Labour 
Market Research, Lewis (1985) estimated the elasticities of substitution between 
young and adult workers by gender. He concluded that there was a very high 
degree of substitutability between different categories of labour and hence a 
high negative effect of wages on employment.
 A well-known Australian study undertaken for the Productivity Commission 
(Daly et al. 1998) uses econometric analysis of a large cross-sectional data set (the 
Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey 1995) to isolate the influence 
of wages from the influence of other factors affecting youth employment. It 
found there is a significant substitution between youth and adult labour and 
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hence a negative relationship between youth employment and youth wages. 
The best estimates suggest that a 1 per cent increase in youth wages would lead 
to a decrease in youth employment of 2–5 per cent in industries employing a 
relatively high proportion of youth.
Lewis and McLean (1999) carried out a simulation exercise on the effects of the 
‘adults at 18’ proposal to abolish junior rates of pay for those over 18 proposed 
by the ACTU in the last junior wage case. Assuming elasticities of substitution 
of 1 between hired workers of different ages (a number far more conservative 
than those estimated by Lewis 1985 and Daly et al. 1998) they found that the 
effects of the proposal would have been to significantly reduce employment of 
15, 16 and 17-year-olds.
There are few studies on the elasticity of demand for the output of the cafe, 
restaurant and catering services industry but they all conclude that it is large, 
which concurs with the general view among economists that ‘eating out’ is 
a luxury good. Published studies have estimated elasticities of demand for 
restaurant meals at -0.9 (Divisekera 2007), -1.46 (Eisenhauer and Principe 2009), 
-2.3 (Andersen et al. 1997) and between -1.49 and -3.8 (Jensen and de Boer 
2006). The Divisekera (2007) study was for tourist demand, so is likely to be 
lower than for demand generally since tourists have fewer substitutes (fewer 
alternatives to eating out).
Studies (see, for instance, Cardoso et al. 2012) have considered the substitution 
of labour over times of the day or week as a result of differences in labour costs. 
For instance, firms may redirect production to those periods when overtime 
or penalty rates are not paid, in order to reduce labour costs. The degree of 
substitution has been found to be small (Cardoso et al.) for industries as a 
whole and the possibilities for reorganising production in the restaurant and 
catering industry would appear to be low. However, it is also possible that some 
‘demand-shifting’ of output takes place to weekdays and away from weekend 
(public holiday) demand by consumers. For instance, if a restaurant is closed 
on Sunday, or charges higher prices, customers may shift their demand to a 
weekday. In this case the impact of penalty rates is to reallocate employment to 
weekdays. Unfortunately, there are little data on this to allow  a judgement of 
its size.
On the basis of the above studies we can reasonably assume that σ, the elasticity 
of substitution for hired labour, is between 1 and 3; however, for completeness 
an elasticity of -0.5 is included in the analysis to account for the possibility that 
there is a lesser degree of substitution than suggested by the above studies; and 
ή, the price elasticity of demand for cafe, restaurant and catering services, is 
between -1 and -3; and s is 0.36.
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Table 3 provides simulations of the elasticities of demand for labour based on 
these assumptions. Table 3 can be interpreted as follows. Assuming an elasticity 
of substitution of 2 and an elasticity of demand for industry output of -1 then a 
fall in wage costs of 1 per cent would increase employment by 1.47 per cent in the 
short run and 1.64 per cent in the long run. Using the combinations of smallest 
and largest pairs of elasticities, respectively, lower and upper bounds for labour 
demand elasticities can be read from the table. For instance, given the reasonable 
range of assumptions, a 1 per cent fall in wage costs would increase employment 
by between 0.5 and 3 per cent (both the short run and the long run).
Estimates of the elasticity of demand for hired labour for any alternative pair of 
substitution and output elasticities can also be read from Table 3.
On the basis of the estimates of the elasticity of demand for hired labour, the 
impacts of penalty rates on demand by employers can be projected. For brevity, 
only the two extremes –the lowest possible and the highest possible elasticities 
of demand for hired labour – are shown in Table 4.
Table 3: Estimated wage elasticities of demand for labour, cafe, restaurant 
and catering services industry2,3
Short Run




0.5 1 2 3
-0.5 -0.5 -0.74 -0.96 -1.07
-1 -0.61 -1.00 -1.47 -1.74
-2 -0.68 -1.22 -2.00 -2.54
-3 -0.71 -1.32 -2.27 -3.00
Long Run




0.5 1 2 3
-0.5 -0.5 -0.82 -1.46 -2.1
-1 -0.68 -1.00 -1.64 -2.28
-2 -1.04 -1.36 -2.00 -2.64
-3 -1.40 -1.72 -2.36 -3.00
Source: Author’s estimates.
2 These elasticities of labour demand assume the firm is operating above the shutdown point, with a diminishing 
average product of labour. For a firm at the shutdown point the elasticity of labour demand to the wage is infinite. 
Shutdown can, and obviously does, happen as it does frequently on Sundays and public holidays.
3 Elasticities strictly refer to small changes in wages whereas increases due to (some) penalty rates are quite large. 
Assuming that σ and η are constant, the factor share, s, is endogenous in the following way: If σ exceeds 1, then 
the wage share falls with a rise in the wage rate, and the (long-run) elasticity becomes more negative, and the point 
elasticities in Table 3 are minimum bounds for the arc elasticity. If σ is less than 1, then the wage share rises with a rise 
in the wage rate, and the elasticity becomes less negative and the point elasticities become minimum bounds for the 
arc elasticities. If σ equals 1, then s is invariant to wage changes and the elasticity doesn’t change.
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Table 4 can be read as follows. The first column of numbers is the percentage of 
ordinary time earnings under different penalty rates. So the requirement to pay 
10 per cent extra between 10pm and midnight increases wages to 110 per cent 
of ordinary time. The other penalty rates can be read in the same way. The last 
two items probably require further explanation. “Junior 18 years” and “Junior 
19 years” rows refer to the requirement that 18 and 19 year olds serving alcohol 
must be paid the adult rate. Therefore they receive 100 per cent of the adult 
ordinary time rate, which is 43 per cent more than their junior rate. Paying 19 
year olds 100 per cent of the adult ordinary time rate represents an increased 
wage of 18 per cent of their junior rate.
Table 4: Changes in employment in the cafe, restaurant and catering 









Lower estimate Upper 
estimate
Ordinary time 100 - - -
10pm-midnight 110 10 5.0 30
Midnight-7am 115 15 7.5 45
Saturday 125 25 12.5 75
Sunday 150 50 25 **
Public Holidays 250 150 75 **
Junior 18 years 100 43 21.5 **
Junior 19 years 100 18 19 55
Notes: ** denotes businesses would prefer not to employ anyone under these arrangements.
Source: Author’s estimates.
The final two columns show the number of hours of labour demanded under the 
specified rates of pay relative to demand under standard hours of pay for all hours 
worked. For instance, in “Midnight–7 am” column the extra wage of 15 per cent 
reduces labour demand to between 92.5 per cent (a fall of 7.5 = 15 × 0.5) and 
55 per cent (a fall of 45 = 15 × 3.0) of what it would be if employees were paid 
the rate for standard hours. Penalty rates for Saturday work have the impact of 
reducing labour demand to between 87.5 per cent and 25 per cent of what it 
would be if employees were paid the rate for standard hours.
Some cells in the table contain **, which means that given these wages and 
assumptions regarding elasticity of demand businesses will not want to hire 
any labour. Notice that under both the high and low scenarios this is the case 
for penalty rates on public holidays. Businesses will close on these days, make 
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greater use of owner and family labour, or may choose to hire the absolute 
minimum amount of hired labour if they think it important to remain open as 
part of their business strategy. It is also possible that some businesses will come 
to some technically ‘illegal’ arrangements with employees outside of the award 
conditions.
To summarise, penalty rates for 10pm–midnight work are projected to have 
reduced demand for labour by between 5 and 30 per cent below what would 
be the case with no penalty rates. Penalty rates for midnight–7am work have 
reduced demand for labour by between 7.5 and 45 per cent below what would 
be the case with no penalty rates. Penalty rates for work on Saturdays are 
projected to have reduced demand for labour by between 12.5 and 75 per cent 
below what would be the case with no penalty rates. Penalty rates for work on 
Sunday are projected to have reduced demand for labour by between (under 
the low-estimate scenario) 75  per  cent and 100  per  cent (under the high-
estimate scenario). Penalty rates for public holidays are projected to have almost 
eliminated demand for hired labour.
What can be said is that the removal of industry-specific minimum rates would 
allow greater flexibility for owners to manage their businesses and allow wages 
to be determined by the market. Most economists believe that competitive 
markets, through the price mechanism, represent the best way of allocating 
resources (Hubbard et al. 2011). Businesses will maximise their profits by selling 
the goods and services consumers want, when they want, at the lowest prices. 
Production will be efficient because businesses will organise capital and labour 
in such a way as to reduce costs and maximise revenue in order to maximise their 
profits. Employment will be at a maximum because businesses are producing 
the highest output that people are willing to buy. In order to be able to hire 
workers, businesses must offer wages and conditions that employees are willing 
to accept. This is the basis for allowing businesses flexibility to manage and 
prices (including wages) to be determined by the market.
These results suggest that the imposition of penalty rates has had a significant 
negative effect on employment and turnover in the industry. Since profit margins 
are low, lower turnover would significantly reduce profits.
Some indirect costs of penalty rates
The above effects on labour demand are a result of direct costs imposed by 
regulations governing penalty rates. However, there are also costs relating to 
allocative inefficiency costs and compliance costs related to penalty rates.
Agenda, Volume 21, Number 1, 2014
20
Allocative inefficiency costs arise because, in the presence of regulation, 
businesses will behave differently from the way they would without regulation 
(otherwise regulation would not be necessary), with subsequent impacts on the 
type, quantity and prices of goods and services. For instance, regulation might 
reduce competition which would increase prices, so that consumer welfare is 
reduced. Or restaurants having to meet industrial relations laws may have the 
effect of reducing the hours or days on which consumers can get a meal. In the 
longer term, regulation may well stifle innovation by restricting management 
prerogative on how to organise their business to reduce costs and provide better 
goods and services at lower prices.
Compliance costs fall into two general categories. The first relates to the costs 
of actually abiding by the regulation. These might involve hiring particular 
expertise (accountants or lawyers, for example), taking part in training or owners 
or staff having to devote time to educate themselves in what exactly is required 
under legislation and the costs of non-compliance. The second category of costs 
relates to demonstrating compliance with legislation. This mostly involves record 
keeping, which increasingly involves computer packages but is often referred 
to as paperwork or red tape. The boundary between actually complying with 
legislation and demonstrating compliance can be somewhat blurred. In the case 
of businesses in the cafe, restaurant and catering services industry, compliance 
costs arise from having to calculate penalty rates, to juggling staff to minimise 
wage costs, and demonstrating compliance with penalty rates. Clearly, the less 
regulation imposed upon these businesses the lower will be these costs.
How strong is the hand of restaurant 
employees?
The above analysis examines the impact on demand for labour of an increase or 
cut in wages of exactly the amount of the penalty rate and, conversely, the impact 
of a fall in wages exactly equal to the amount of the penalty rate abolished. 
However, the actual change in wages and, hence, the level of employment (hours 
worked) is determined by the interaction of supply and demand. Workers 
determine the supply of labour. They make decisions on where to work and 
the wage they are willing to accept on the basis of all the alternatives that are 
available. For instance, they will take into account what competitor employers 
are offering, and whether the job allows for flexibility to fit in with, say, study, 
parental duties or leisure time.
The greater the degree of competition for a person’s labour, the less will an 
employer be able to have control over wages, since the worker will easily be able 
to supply their labour elsewhere (Norris et al. 2004). It would be expected that 
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there is a great deal of competition for labour in the cafe, restaurant and catering 
services industry. The reduced labour demand arising from penalty rates 
reduces the availability of jobs, reducing competition on, say, Sundays, since 
many who want to work more hours cannot. Removing penalty rates would 
actually increase competition among employers for hired labour. Also, workers 
can find many jobs that demand similar skills and working conditions in the 
retail sector, hospitality, licensed clubs and the accommodation industries.
Several industries are competitors in the labour market for women with children 
with respect to a mix of part-time workers and the percentage of women. It can 
be concluded that there is a great deal of competition for female labour. This 
implies that there is little scope for the cafe, restaurant and catering services 
industry businesses to impose wages and conditions of employment which 
employees are not willing to voluntarily enter into.
One reason which could be put forward for the need for higher payments at 
certain times and days is the principle of ‘compensating differentials’ whereby 
additional payments have to be paid to employees in order to attract them to 
undertake unpleasant or dangerous work (Norris et al. 2004). In the context 
of penalty rates, the term ‘unsocial hours’ is often used to justify the need for 
compensating differentials (penalty rates) in order to attract employees during 
these hours. Certainly in the days when a typical worker worked full-time, five 
days per week or more, this may have been true but this is hardly true of the 
cafe, restaurant and catering industry. The final test of whether employees need 
to be compensated (receive higher pay) for unsocial hours is whether businesses 
can attract people to work these hours at the standard rate of pay. If they cannot 
then clearly the standard rate of pay would be too low and businesses would 
need to offer higher rates to attract people. The market would determine the 
appropriate penalty.
However, in a labour market such as that characterised by the cafe, restaurant 
and catering services industry, full-time work is the exception rather than the 
rule. Also, for students, the hours typically characterised as unsocial are actually 
the hours when they are free from obligations to attend their school, college or 
university. The industry is characterised by great flexibility in employment, 
which implies a great deal of scope for employees to choose the hours and days 
they want to supply their labour.
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Who would benefit from removing penalty 
rates?
Those who are lucky enough to be employed benefit most from the current 
arrangements and might be worse off without penalty rates, although we cannot 
be sure because these people may well want more hours of work which they 
cannot currently get. The question arises as to who would benefit from changes 
to penalty rates.
Owners of cafe, restaurant and catering services businesses would benefit but 
not necessarily greatly. This is because the industry is very competitive. In a 
competitive industry most cost savings are eventually passed on to consumers 
in lower prices as output expands from both existing firms and by new firms 
entering the industry (Hubbard et al. 2012). Profit margins would be expected 
to fall to the rate they were before the fall in labour costs. The volume of profit 
per business will increase as turnover is increased. A greater ability of managers 
to organise the business in the most efficient way would be expected to improve 
the productivity of the sector.
Suppliers (and their employees) to businesses in the industry, such as food 
wholesalers, farmers, and commercial property renters, would benefit as 
output of the industry rises, increasing the demand for inputs. Complementary 
industries, such as those in tourism, for example, would benefit from customers 
having a greater range of choice and lower prices. Australia would be a more 
attractive destination for overseas tourists.
There would unambiguously be more employment in the industry as turnover 
increased. There would be greater choice of shifts available. There would be 
more employment opportunities for the unemployed, with the potential for 
providing a stepping-stone into further employment.
Some employees, although their wage rate may fall, may even receive higher 
totalearnings without penalty rates since the potential to work a greater number 
of hours will increase.
The biggest beneficiaries from removing penalty rates would be consumers. 
They would pay lower prices, eat out more and at times which better suit their 
lifestyle.
The removal of penalty rates would make the economy more efficient and 
productive as distortions in the allocation of resources would be reduced.
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The Fair Work Commission’s Restaurant 
Award
The arguments presented in this paper formed the basis for the restaurant 
industry case in the Fair Work Commission’s two-yearly review of the Restaurant 
Industry Award 2010 (Restaurant Award). In her judgement of 10 October 2013, 
Deputy President Gooley rejected a large range of proposals to vary the award, 
including proposals to reduce pay rates for small businesses, abolish weekend 
penalty rates and modify the classification structure of the award (FWC 2013).
However, in response to an appeal by the Restaurant and Catering Association 
of Victoria (RACV) the majority of the Full Bench (not without strong opposition 
from the minority) on the 14 May 2014 came to a monumental, if somewhat 
confusing, judgement (FWC 2014):
The RCAV’s case that the reduction in the Sunday penalty rate from 50% 
to 25% would have significant benefits for employment and business 
turnover was not made out.
but
It is accepted however that Sunday penalty rates may have a limited 
effect on employment, particularly in relation to owner-operators 
working on Sundays in preference to engaging staff for additional hours.
and
… for transient and lower-skilled casual employees working mainly on 
weekends, who are primarily younger workers, the superimposition 
of the casual loading of 25% in addition to the 50% penalty tends 
to overcompensate them for working on Sundays and is more than is 
required to attract them for work on that day.
In summary, the penalty rate for casual low-skilled workers at the Introductory 
level, Level 1 and Level 2 (basic kitchen and waiting staff) on Sundays has been 
reduced from 50 per cent to 25 per cent. However, for workers at Level 3 to 
Level 6 (cooks etc.) the award is unchanged, as it is for those employed on a 
permanent basis who work on Sundays.
Also, somewhat intriguingly, the Full Bench (FWC 2014) found that:
The Restaurant Award shall be varied, effective from 1 July 2014, to 
allow employees classified as Food and Beverage Attendants Grade 1 to 
receive money from customers, and employees classified as Food and 
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Beverage Attendants Grade 2 to take reservations and greet and seat 
guests, subject to the requirement that no existing employee should 
have his or her classification reduced as a result of this variation.
While the above changes may seem to be relatively minor and there is still a 
reluctance to admit that employment and wages are related, the decision by 
the Full Bench has been greeted by commentators, industry associations and 
businesses as a monumental decision. Hopefully the FWC’s (partial) acceptance 
that (some) penalty rates are an unnecessary impediment to businesses has 
opened the door to further labour market reform.
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